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POLITICAL SCIENCE 
The Politics of Integration in Europe 
W. HARTLEY CLARK 
Carleton College, Northfield 
"The United States of Europe has begun,"2 wrote 
one of the fathers of European integration, Jean Mon-
net, in 1955. He was referring to the fact that in the 
European Coal and Steel Community there had come 
into existence on an all-European level a new and un-
precedented institution possessing governmental powers. 
How much more true would his words have been after 
the creation of the European Economic Community, the 
Common Market, in 1957-a new community with jur-
isdiction over all European economic affairs and aiming 
toward the creation of an all-European government? 
Comm0n Market President Hallstein characterized the 
first four years of the Common Market by saying it had 
passed the "point of no return"8, i.e., that the forces 
then set in motion would lead inexorably toward an 
United States of Europe. 
Not only is the Common Market today the embryo 
of a new European government, its present institutions 
may well be the actual framework in which the future 
power of government over Europe will accumulate. The 
internationally minded Europeans would prefer to have 
it that way. In a recent address, President Hallstein said: 
"The EEC is in no way a purely economic venture re-
quiring it to be duplicated by a political venture . . . 
From what has just been said of the political nature of 
the European Economic Community, it follows that the 
Commission is bound to adopt an unreservedly positive 
attitude towards any extension of European unfication 
to other fields than that of economic and social policy, 
notably defense ... [and] foreign affairs ... ; in short, 
to whatever comes under the heading of "political un-
ion" . . . it can legitimately be felt that such an ex-
tension ought to take the form of an enlargement and 
strengthening of the existing Communities . . . 4 
One can not grasp the politics of this new European 
entity by merely reading the constitutional provisions of 
the Treaty of Rome that founded the Common Market 
in 1957. As Sorbonne professor Maurice Bye has re-
cently put it: 
"Europe cannot be viewed as a prize piece of architec-
ture designed at Rome in a perfect treaty with ideal 
lines. Europe will be the new scene of new conflicts be-
tween new powers. " 5 
It is the purpose of the following passages to explain 
what the new powers are, how they interplay, and what 
kind of political order they are evolving toward. 
New Powers: The new foci of power on the European 
level are the political organs of the Common Market : 
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the Council of Ministers, the Commission, and the Euro-
pean Parliamentary Assembly. All three wish to aug-
ment their power, and all three are more or less de-
voted to the cause of European unity. The Council of 
Ministers consists of one representative from each mem-
ber government, but the weights of their votes vary ac-
cording to the size of the governments on certain issues. 
Its purview is the question of European integration in 
all respects, economic• and political; and this is an im-
portant feature that the name "Common Market" tends 
to blur. The decisions of the Council have the force of 
law, and are reached according to a complex voting 
system. Although at first most decisions required unan-
imous approval, the Rome Treaty provided for the 
introduction later of a qualified majority voting scheme 
whereby no great power could block a decision unless 
it had an ally. 0 
The Council occupies an important part of the time 
of the corps of west European foreign ministers, who 
spend better than half of their professional lives to-
gether, if not on Common Market business, then on 
NATO or other organized European business. It is the 
highest echelon of European statesmen below the heads-
of-state. Not only do the ministers have considerable 
political power in their own right, but they are for the 
most part internationally minded and want to promote 
the Common Market's evolution. One misap-
praises the ministers if one views them as a brake 
upon the Common Market, always to be feared by the 
internationalists. They are more apt to plead the cause 
of the Common Market to their home governments than 
the other way around. Service in delegations to the 
Common Market is a training ground for national civil 
service advancement', moreover, not a burial ground for 
men unwanted at the home capitals. The Council is 
highly bureauocratized with permanent national dele-
gations in Brussels numbering up to fifty each, includ-
ing specialists that meet in sub-committees continually 
to prepare decisions for the Council. These staffs are also 
supporters of the Common Market. 
For all their stature and intern'ationalism, the foreign 
ministers are still confined to the limits of policy im-
posed on them by their home governments. The Coun-
cil failed to agree on a common set of cereal prices in 
March, 1963, for example, because Germany would not 
lower and France would not raise prices far enough to 
reach an accomodation. 7 
The Commission consists of nine international civil 
servants chosen jointly by the governments and includ-
ing two each from the great powers and one each from 
the small. It has influence over Common Market pol-












icy in that it drafts the original policy proposals and can, 
if it wishes, present them to the Council on an all-or-
nothing basis. 8 As more regulations are adopted by the 
Council, the Commission will, in its role as implementor, 
emerge as an important administrative institution for 
Europe. The Commissioners have fixed terms, but this 
is merely a reserve device for ridding the Commission 
of undesireables. The terms are ordinarily renewed, and 
Commissioners resign in mid-term if they find better 
jobs. They employ a secretariat of about 1,800.° 
The Commission has often been misrepresented as a 
body of "technocrats", heading a new sort of European 
technocracy.10 The Common Market is, on the con-
trary, no more a technocracy than any other political 
entity in Europe. Commission President Hallstein clar-
ified this matter in his oft-quoted statement, "We are 
not in business at all: we are in politics."11 The members 
of the Commission have either entered that body from 
the field of politics or have become politicians while 
members.12 They have been ministers in their own gov-
ernments, and they or their successors will be the min-
isters of the United States of Europe tomorrow. Each 
heads a direction, or ministry, organized parallel to the 
conventional national ministries: finance, foreign affairs, 
agriculture, etc. They meet as a cabinet each week to 
agree on policy and strategy, and the President of the 
Commission bears somewhat the same relation to the 
other Commissioners as does a national prime minister 
to his cabinet colleagues. 
The success of the Commission has depended heavily 
on their ability to probe and prod the national minis-
tries that have the ultimate power over Common Market 
progress. For a period, however, there went along with 
this political sophistication a tendency in the Commis-
sion to assume that somehow the Common Market 
would escape the natural weaknesses of a new interna-
tional organization. Driven on as it was by the initial 
momentum of the Community's inauguration, the Com-
mission was somewhat over-ambitious and over-confi-
dent; and when the momentum was checked in January, 
1963, i.e., when British membership was vetoed, there 
was a serious break in morale. 
The European Parliamentary Assembly consists of 
delegates chosen by the parties in each of the parliaments 
of the member governments, according to the ratio of 
party strength at home. Hence, there are large numbers 
of Christian Democrats, Gaullists, and Social Democrats, 
which caucus as international parties for the purposes 
of the European Parliament. The influence of the Par-
liament is today largely indirect, because it holds no 
legislative powers and may only advise or recommend 
action by the Council or Commission-with one excep-
tion. It can remove the Commissioners from office.1 3 
The political importance of the Parliament today lies 
chiefly in the personalities it includes: from the elderly 
fathers of the movement for European unity to the 
young, ambitious politicians for whom service with the 
Parliament represents a political distinction. The influ-
ence of the parliamentarians is limited, however, by the 
fact that the national parliamentary leaders can not af-
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ford time to be members of the European parliament. 
Members spend from one to three quarters of their time 
on European parliamentary business, a situation that 
limits the possible impact of European parliamentarians 
on their home parliaments. The European Parliament 
campaigns constantly fo r an increase in its power; but 
it is, in a more basic sense, biding its time and perfecting 
its procedures in anticipation of the day when it be-
comes a real parliament with compulsive powers derived 
either from its existing power to remove Commissioners 
( a power of little value until the Commissioners become 
themselves more important) or with the establishment 
of some new basis for power. 
As one views the three political institutions of the 
Common Market together, they appear to form a con-
stitutional oligarchy, the Council of Ministers being the 
oligarchic rulers, the Commission their body of chief 
clerks, and the European Parliamentary Assembly their 
sounding board for popular grievances. In a primitive 
political framework such as this, democracy is only 
a remote ideal. 
The Interplay of Forces: Although today there is a dis-
tinct hierarchy of power among the political bodies of 
the Common Market, there are tendencies emerging in 
the interplay of new forces that suggest that the present 
arrangement of power is only transitional. These ten-
dencies are reminiscent of the evolution of British gov-
ernment during the eighteenth century.14 The British 
monarch, once supreme in his realm, came to be de-
pendent upon his cabinet in order to manage the Com-
mons; and subsequently the Commons forced the cab-
inet to be responsible to it. In the case of the Common 
Market, as the Council of Ministers gains more decision-
making discretion, it confers more power and respon-
sibility on the Commission; and, as the Commission 
gains a stronger footing, the European Parliament will 
hold it more strictly to account. 
The Council of Ministers is drawing decision-making 
authority away from governments in two ways. First, on 
a slow cumulative basis, the Council is enacting Com-
mon Market policies, like its anti-trust regulation of 
1961, that will henceforth be outside the hands of the 
governments. Secondly, while passing through the pre-
scribed steps in establishing the Common Market, the 
Council is gaining new power to act by majority vote, 
hence limiting governmental authority in a general way, 
i.e., an unwilling government can be bound to a policy 
adopted by majority vote of the Council. 
The transmission of authority via the Council to the 
Commission is now just getting under way. The initial 
behavior of the Commission toward the Council of Min-
isters was timid. Although the Commission had the 
power to refuse the amendment of draft proposals they 
did not want changed by the ministers, they were in 
fact very solicitous of the ministers and amenable to 
change. Even rather early, however, the Commission ex-
erted some of its authority when it slashed to a minimum 
the number of national exceptions to be allowed from 
new tariff reductions. 
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The general co-operativeness of the Commission was 
necessitated by the initial tendency of the ministers to 
avoid decisions. Although carrying through the tariff 
disarmament agreed to in the Rome Treaty, the Council 
dwelt so long over such matters as setting up the Com-
missions office that it was only ready to pass its en-
abling "legislation" in the fields of anti-trust and farm 
policy at the last minute before agreeing to allow the 
Common Market to graduate into its "second stage". 
In fact, the ministers were half a month late, and there 
was a possibility at Christmas, 1961, that the Common 
Market would be a failure. Being allowed to pass into 
the second stage was immensely heartening to the Com-
mission, which proceeded to map out an ambitious 
schedule for future policy making, only to lose momen-
tum once more over the blocking of British entry into 
the Common Market. Throughout the Gaullist period 
in France the Commission and Council of Ministers had 
accustomed themselves to French vetos and anti-Euro-
pean attitudes, but the Anglo-French stalemate at Brus-
sels looked especially menacing. Nor did Germany prom-
ise to compensate for the new situation. Although the 
President of the Commission was a protege of German 
Chancellor Adenauer, the Chancellor was to be suc-
ceeded soon by Economics Minister Erhard, the political 
foe of Adenauer and a man known to have limited ex-
pectations of the Common Market. The Council of Min-
isters remained, therefore, comparatively weak; and the 
Commission could not yet insist on its full share of 
decision-making power without injuring the Council and 
the integration movement in general. 
The Commission was accumulating administrative 
powers, however, and these were beginning to assume 
significant proportions. In administering the agricultural 
regulations adopted by the Council in 1962, the office 
of the Commission has been constantly fixing prices 
and levies on European trade in food and is coming to 
be relied upon in much the same way as a national agri-
cultural ministry. Moreover, new administrative powers 
are created continually for the Commission, as when 
the Council authorized the Commission to take the requi-
site action should international migration drive up farm 
real estate prices excessively, to cite a recent example 
of February, 1963.15 One indication of the importance 
of the Commission's power is the establishment of some 
one hundred pressure groups in offices at Brussels, al-
beit that a number of them are promoted by the Com-
mission itself as public relations aids. 
Identifying the tendency for new power to be trans-
mitted from the Commission to the European Parlia-
ment poses a difficult problem. Just as the Commission 
has been slow to press the Council in recent years, the 
Parliament has been slow to press the Commission, not 
wanting to compromise the Commission's new-found 
position of importance. Initially, the Commission and the 
Parliament have been in league with one another. It 
was no secret to the Commission that the Council re-
garded the Parliament with condescension, but the Com-
mission-pursued the support of the Parliament diligently. 
Although playing little role in the proceedings of the 
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Parliament, the Commissioners attended faithfully and 
tried hard to avoid unnecessary disagreements with the 
parliamentarians, hoping in the end to have the Parlia-
ment's endorsement for the draft proposals of the Com-
mission being readied for decision by the Council of 
Ministers. So long as the Commission thought the Par-
liament was important, it was important, because the 
wooing by the Commission gave the Parliament de facto 
leverage where it was lacking in de jure legislative power 
and impressed the Parliament's ideas on the work of 
the Commission. Just recently the Commission con-
ducted research into the breakdown of the Anglo-Com-
mon Market negotiations at the behest of the European 
Parliament.16 The Commission's faith in the Parliament 
is founded in the conviction that it is the best group 
to lobby in the national governments, which are, in the 
last analysis, in control of the members of the Council 
of Ministers. 
As the Commission grows in power, its tradition of 
close consultation with the Parliament will act to trans-
mit some of that power to the Parliament itself. More 
important still, however, the Parliament's power to re-
move the Commission will gain real meaning once there 
is some real decision-making power at stake in the Com-
mission. Today, a rejection of the Commission by the 
Parliament might seriously damage the whole effort for 
European unity; tomorrow, a rejection of the Com-
mission might make the Parliament clearly sovereign 
within the international household. The Commission, 
after all, has no power to dismiss the Parliament. 
Once the Parliament has acquired material power, it 
will become critically important to implement the pro-
vision of the Rome Treaty for the direct election of 
Parliament, if the evolving governance of Europe is to 
have a rigorously democratic quality; and the Parliament 
itself is impatient for the direct election system to com-
mence. Although there is no certainty that direct elec-
tion now will actually increase the political stature of 
the parliamentarians, the Parliament is driven to de-
mand separate election by the mere physical impossibility 
for its members to attend adequately to both their Euro-
pean parliamentary business and the business of their 
national parliaments at home. Certainly at whatever time 
direct elections become feasible and the issues faced by 
the Common Market ate the ones of keenest interest to 
the voting public, an electoral victory for a European 
parliamentarian will confer upon him and his assembly 
the most basic kind of democratic legitimacy and pow-
er.11 
The Political Order of Integrated Europe : If the pat-
tern of evolution mapped out above were to be followed 
to a logical conclusion, the political organization of the 
Europe of the future might look as follows : The Coun-
cil of Ministers might come to play a role like that of 
the Bundesrat in the German government, including as 
it does the representatives of states. It would act on 
Community measures just as the Bundesrat acts on Ger-
man laws. The Commission may bifurcate, a tendency 
it is already showing, with the President becoming both 













the titular head of government and also the guiding 
spirit of the executive cabinet, much like the Gaullist 
presidency of France. The Council of Ministers may 
well continue to choose the Commissioners, but as the 
Parliament gains in strength, the Council may be forced 
to choose, as a matter of course, the leaders of the prin-
cipal party in the Parliamentary Assembly. Since the 
Parliament has the power of removal, it could turn out 
a group of Commissioners elected by the Council that 
was not to its ( the Parliament's) liking. Thus the Com-
mission would become responsible to the Parliament, 
as is true of any parliamentary government; and, if the 
Rome Treaty provision for popular election of the Par-
liament were implemented, a parliamentary democracy 
would exist. All of the foregoing could take place without 
formal change in any part of the present Rome treaty, 
and the result could be a government composed of a 
president, a responsible executive cabinet, and a two-
house legislature, one a federal house (the Council) and 
the other a democratic house ( the Assembly). The Com-
munity already has its own court system. 
It is possible that the burgeoning institutions of the 
European Community will someday be set aside and a 
new and scientifically designed constitution adopted for 
an United States of Europe. Many years may pass, how-
ever, before such a reform could be possible; and dur-
ing the interim the present Community institutions, 
evolving along the lines just indicated, will establish a 
European governing tradition that it will be difficult for 
any constitution-writers of the future to discard. 
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